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Abstract
We develop a method to evaluate shareholder activism when an activist targets
rms whose shareholders are diversied portfolio holders of possibly correlated rms.
Our method of evaluation takes the portfolios of all of the shareholders, including
the activist, as its basis of analysis. We model the activist from the time of the
acquisition of a foothold in the target rm through the moment when the activist
divests the newly acquired shares. We assume that during this period, all exchanges
of securities, and their corresponding prices, are achieved in Walrasian markets in
which all participants, including the activist, are risk-averse price-takers. Using the
derived series of price changes of all the rms in the market, as well as the derived
series of changes in all the portfolio holdings over this period, we evaluate the impact
of activism on the activist, on the group of other shareholders, and on the combined
group. We show that when activism is benecial to the activist, the group of other
investors may not benet; furthermore, even when the activist benets from activism,
the value of the market may decrease. When the activist benets from activism, an
increase in the value of the market is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the
group of other investors to benet also from activism. In addition, we show that the
combined group, the activist plus the group of other investors, benets if and only if
the value of the market increases and, under this condition, either the activist or the
group of other investors, but not necessarily both, benets.
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1 Introduction
We develop a method to evaluate shareholder activism when an activist targets rms
whose shareholders are diversied portfolio holders of possibly correlated rms. Our
method of evaluation takes the portfolios of all of the shareholders, including the ac-
tivist, as its basis of analysis. We model the activist from the time of the acquisition
of a foothold in the target rm through the moment when the activist divests the
newly acquired shares. We assume that, during this period, all exchanges of securi-
ties, and their corresponding prices, are achieved in Walrasian markets in which all
participants, including the activist, are risk-averse price-takers. Using the derived
series of price changes of all the rms in the market, as well as the derived series
of changes in all the portfolio holdings over this period, we evaluate the impact of
activism on the activist, on the group of other shareholders, and on the combined
group. Our evaluation provides answers to the following questions: Who benets
from activism? If the activist benets, is it at the expense of the other investors?
Do the benets of activism, when they occur, imply an increase in the value of the
market over the period of activism?1
Our contribution to the literature is the proposal of a method of evaluation of
activism which is applicable not only to the activist but also to other market partic-
ipants, and which takes into account the diversication of shareholdersportfolios.2
Using our method, we show that when activism is benecial to the activist, the group
of other investors may not benet; furthermore, even when the activist benets from
activism, the value of the market may decrease. When the activist benets from
1Variants of these questions have been raised elsewhere, for example, in Kahan and Rock (2007),
Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010), and Edmans (2013).
2See Hansen and Lott (1996) who emphasize that, in the presence of externalities, the appropri-
ate objective of analysis is the portfolio, in which spillovers can be incorporated, rather than the
individual stock prices and their responses to announcements.
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activism, an increase in the value of the market is a necessary but not su¢ cient con-
dition for the group of other investors to benet also from activism. In addition, we
show that the combined group, the activist plus the group of other investors, benets
if and only if the value of the market increases and, under this condition, either the
activist or the group of other investors, but not necessarily both, benets.
Our approach to activism di¤ers from others not only in its dealing with diversied
portfolio holders3 and in its method of evaluation, but also in describing the process
by which the activist acquires and ultimately divests of new shares in the target
rm.4 In other models, one or more of the following, which we assume, are not
assumed: Owners of the target rm are diverse portfolio holders, owners of the target
rm are risk-averse investors, all market participants are involved as price-takers in a
Walrasian market, and the focus is on the entire period of involvement of the activist.
Furthermore, other models generally do not focus on evaluating activism from the
perspective of the activist as distinct from the group of other shareholders.5
Elsewhere when evaluation is discussed, evaluation depends on the impact on the
target rm alone.6 For example, in the empirical literature activism is judged as
3An exception to the general lack of consideration of diversied shareholdersportfolios is Admati
et al. (1994) where diversied portfolios are considered but, unlike in our approach, the activist is
given extraordinary power in rst choosing the size of the foothold and only following that does the
market come into play. Though obviously in this approach the activist benets, attention in the
paper is directed to equilibrium in the securities market (where small passive investors benet in a
free-rider sense), but not to an explicit evaluation of the impact of activism on the other shareholders
as distinct from the activist or on the value of the market.
4See, for example, Edmans (2013) for a thorough review of theoretical and empirical literature
on blockholders and shareholder activism.
5There are exceptions, as in, for example, Cli¤ord (2008), Becht et al. (2009) and Boyson and
Mooradian (2011).
6For example, Bebchuk et al. (2013) argue that activism does not produce long term deleterious
e¤ects on target rms. Exceptions to the focus on the evaluation of activism on a single target rm
include Lee and Park (2009) and Gantchev et al. (2013) who nd spillover e¤ects from a target rm
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being benecial based on the increase in the price of shares of the target rm at the
time the activist announces acquiring those shares via a Schedule 13D ling.7 As our
results show, neglecting the diversication of shareholders in the method of evaluation
may lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the benets of activism. Other issues of
interpretation arise when statements concerning the benets to shareholders do not
distinguish between those pertaining to the activist, those pertaining to the group of
other investors in the target rm, or those pertaining to the combined group.
In Section 2 we model the sequence of equilibria prices and holdings of diversied
shareholders over the course of activism. In Section 3 we develop the conditions on
which the initial decision of activism is based. We propose a method of evaluation of
activism in Section 4, and use the results derived in Sections 2 and 3 to implement this
proposal and investigate its ramications. In Section 5 we raise issues for discussion
and suggest possible extensions to our model.
2 The Impact of Activism on Prices and Portfolio
Rebalancing
The model that we consider species four moments in time at which investors gather
together to compete for shares in rms for their portfolios. These moments are
to others.
7See, for example, Brav et al. (2009) and Klein and Zur (2009). Both studies highlight the increase
in average excess return around the time of Schedule 13D ling, and its persistence. Primarily on
that basis, both studies posit activism benets target rm shareholders. Boyson and Mooradian
(2011) and Cli¤ord (2008), for example, nd that both activist hedge funds and shareholders benet
from activism when considering a single rm. Becht et al. (2009) in a study of a single U.K. fund,
nd activism benets that fund and also its shareholders. Becht et al. (2014), studying activism in
Asia, Europe and North America, nd activism is associated with abnormal returns to the target
rm in the three regions.
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distinguished by the information sets available to investors at each of these points in
time. At time t = 0, all participants hold the same view regarding the future values
of the rms, and come together to buy shares in these rms based on that commonly
held information. We refer to the set of portfolios determined in this manner as the
benchmark portfolios. We assume that the benchmark portfolios remain the same
until one of those investors, called the activist, comes to believe that his involvement
can alter the performance of a rm. Since his belief in the future value of the rm
is di¤erent from that of all other market participants at this point, the acquisition of
new ownership would be di¢ cult if this information were shared with other investors.
Thus, we assume that the activist must surreptitiously acquire these new shares,
keeping his belief in the future value of the target rm to himself.
Given this belief, the activist must rst decide whether it would be advantageous
for him to act on the basis of this belief. If not, activism obviously does not occur.
Should the decision to act be taken, then the activist moves at time t = 1 to acquire
shares to facilitate his objective. This move at time t = 1 precipitates a new competi-
tive market equilibrium with asymmetric information: The activist acts on his private
information while the views of all other investors concerning the future values of the
set of rms remain unchanged. If the activist acquires a su¢ cient number of shares,
then, at time t = 2; the activist announces this publicly by ling Schedule 13D.8 At
the time of the ling, the other investors become informed of the activists intent to
improve the performance of the rm. Note, time t = 2 might follow quite closely after
time t = 1: Having gained knowledge of the activists intent, the remaining investors
enter into a new competitive equilibrium for shares. Here, the activist refrains from
entering into trading since he needs the shares he has already acquired to carry out
8When an owner acquires 5% or more of the voting power of a registered security, and has the
intent to attempt to alter the policies of the current management, SEC rules require that Schedule
13D (the so-called benecial ownership report), be led within 10 days.
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his activist program. Subsequently, at time t = 3, it becomes known to all market
participants whether or not the activist has been successful in his plans to improve
the rm.9 This new information acquired by all market participants induces a new
competitive equilibrium with all investors participating. Should the activists hold-
ings fall su¢ ciently, he announces this by ling an amended Schedule 13D (Schedule
13D/A). The time between t = 2 and t = 3 can be lengthy. Finally, at time T , all
uncertainty concerning the rms is resolved and all the rms are liquidated.
In each competitive market equilibrium we assume that there exists the same
set of N risky assets and a riskless one. Each of the M risk-averse investors is a
price-taker and a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility of end-of-period wealth
maximizer. We now introduce some notation. Let xit be the N x 1 vector of shares
held by investor i, i = 1; :::;M; at time t; t = 0; 1; 2; 3; in the N rms. Let yit be the
amount investor i borrows (lends) at time t to facilitate purchases. Let epit be an N
x 1 vector of random prices per share of the N rms that would prevail at time T
as perceived by investor i at time t, and let p0 be the price of the riskless asset. Let
ui be the utility function of investor i, wit be the wealth with which the ith investor
comes to the market at time t and, for convenience, let p0 = 1:
At time t; t = 0; 1; 2; 3, the equilibrium process is dened as follows. Taking the N
x 1 vector pt as given, investor i determines xit which satises arg maxxit Eitui(yit +
x0itepit) s:t: yit + x0itpt = wit where Eit is the expectation of investor i at time t with
respect to the distribution of epit and a prime denotes a transpose operation. The
equilibrium price vector at time t, Pt; yields the demands xit so that all shares are
sold, i.e.,
MP
i=1
xit = Q where Q is the N x 1 vector whose elements are the total
number of shares in each of the N risky rms. For convenience, we normalize Q
9In our model we do not allow the leakage of information as to the success of the activist between
time t = 2 and time t = 3; however, we mention the additional complications such leakage might
engender in Section 5 below.
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and represent it by 1; an N x 1 vector whose elements are 1; so that xit represents
the vector of proportional ownership of investor i at time t in the N risky rms.
We assume that each investor has an exponential utility function with Pratt-Arrow
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion ai:We further assume that the random vector epit
is normally distributed with mean vector it and positive denite covariance matrix

it:With these assumptions, the equilibrium solution at each time t is the solution to
a specic nonhomogeneous (homogeneous) portfolio problem based on the changing
information. Solutions to each of these problems are derived by applying the results
from Rabinovitch and Owen (1978).
Maximizing the expected utility for each of the participants at each moment of
time results in the maximum expected utility over the time period t = 0 to t = 3:
This follows because, since borrowing and lending are allowed, the only carryover
when optimizing at time t is the resulting wealth from the optimization at time
t   1: However, as shown in Rabinovitch and Owen (1978), the optimum solutions,
xit and Pt; at time t do not depend on this preceding wealth. Therefore, each local
optimization is separate from any other. Furthermore, our choice of four trading
moments is based on the assumption that trading only takes place at those times
when a change of information occurs, and we assume these changes are independent
of one another.
In our model, we have chosen to abstract from the usual activities of the activist,
for example, from attempting to acquire representation on the board, changing divi-
dend policy, changing CEO salary, and/or selling parts of the rm, etc. Instead, we
have chosen to characterize activities into ways in which they alter the future distri-
bution of prices. Specically, some activities will a¤ect the mean, others the variance
and still others the covariance of the target rm with other rms. Indeed, some activ-
ities will a¤ect these three features in various combinations. This abstraction permits
us to deal with the issue of diversied ownership.
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We now introduce the specics of our model. At time t = 0, all investors agree on
their assessments of the distribution of prices that will occur at time T . Thus, in this
case, i0 = 0 and 
i0 = 
0: We state this well-known equilibrium solution result
without proof in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. At time t = 0, i0 = 0 and 
i0 = 
0; i = 1; :::;M: Then the
equilibrium solution yielding the benchmark is xi0 =
di
d
1; i = 1; :::;M; and P0 =
0 1d
01 where di = 1ai and d =
P
di:
Following this market exchange, one of the investors comes to believe that, with
su¢ cient shares in a particular rm, he can improve its performance and thereby
benet from his activism.10 We designate this activist as investor 1; and refer to
the activist as A. The single rm that is the target of As interest is rm 1:11 Since
we have assumed that all investors can borrow, lend, as well as sell short, A must
have these capabilities as well. Thus, our model necessarily excludes mutual funds as
activists, but includes both hedge fund activists and other entrepreneurial activists
such as individual investors and private equity funds.12
If A proceeds with his plan to acquire additional shares, it is done surreptitiously,
and it forces a new round of trading. A comes to this round of trading with predictions
as to how his involvement in the target rm would alter the future distribution of
10Although we do not explore the case in which the activist might benet even if his activities are
detrimental to the target rm, our model could be used to examine this situation. See comments in
Section 5, below.
11The activist has only one target rm in our model. This assumption is made for convenience of
exposition.
12Mutual funds are subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 which, among other things,
prevents them from selling short, borrowing, and holding concentrated positions. Hedge funds, by
having a small number of high net worth investors, are not subject to this Act, and, accordingly, are
not governed by the regulation of fees specied in the Act. See, for example, Brav et al. (2008, pp.
1734-1736) for a discussion of di¤erences between mutual funds and hedge funds.
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prices of all securities. In particular, we assume this involvement would change the
mean and the covariance matrix of As distribution by the amounts  and 
;
respectively. We note that both these changes depend on the change that would
occur should A be successful with his plans, the change that would occur should A be
unsuccessful with his plans, and the probability of each. For convenience, we assume
that should A be unsuccessful, the parameters revert to those at time t = 0; i.e.,
 = 
 = 0:13 This framework leads to a heterogeneous information equilibrium
whose solution is given in Proposition 2. The proof of this proposition, and all
following propositions and the lemma, can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Let the distributional parameters for A be 11 = 0 +  and

11 = 
0 + 
 and let those for investor i; i = 2; :::;M; be i1 = 0 and 
i1 = 
0:
Then, at t = 1; the equilibrium solution is given by
[dI + (d  d1)

 10 ](P1 P0) = d1( 
1=d)
x11   x10 = (d  d1)
 10 (P1 P0) and
xi1   xi0 =  di
 10 (P1  P0) for i = 2; :::;M:
Proposition 2 establishes the relationship between the changes in prices and the
changes in the portfolios held by all investors due to activism. These changes are
based on the changes in the mean and covariance matrices, and 
; respectively.
Since  and 
 are arbitrary in this proposition, we now restrict them, in keeping
with our modelling of A. We assume at time t = 1 that A is active only in rm 1,
and believes that the expected price per share of rm 1 will increase by m > 0 if he
succeeds, and remain the same otherwise.14 The expected values of the remaining
rms are unchanged. The variance of the price of rm 1; as well as the covariances of
13Not making this assumption would introduce additional free parameters complicating, but not
changing, our results.
14The issue of whether the activist could benet if m < 0 is discussed later.
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the price of rm 1 with the other rms, might, however, change.15 The covariances
between two prices, neither of which involves rm 1, are unchanged. Thus, we assume
that the covariance matrix of prices might change in the rst row and rst column
if the activist succeeds and would remain the same otherwise. We next make these
changes explicit.
We introduce the following notation. The subscript  1 is used for a vector or
matrix to denote that vector or matrix without its rst element or rst row, respec-
tively, e.g., the N x 1 vector v; with rst element v1; is written as v0= (v1;v0 1):
We let 
 10 = (!
1; :::;!N) =
0@ !11 !10 1
!1 1 R
1A where R is a positive denite N   1 x
N   1 symmetric matrix. The omission of the rst row of the matrix 
 10 will be
written as 
 1 1;0: If we dene the N x N matrix V =
0@ v1 v0 1
v 1 0
1A and  as the
probability that A will succeed in his plans, A approaches the market at t = 1 with
parameters 11= 0+me1 and 
11 = 
0+V where e1 is an N x 1 vector with 1 in
the rst position and zeros elsewhere. The other investors remain with their previous
information, i.e., i1= 0 and 
i1 = 
0; i = 2; :::;M: We next present a lemma that
permits us to solve explicitly for the inverse needed to determine the equilibrium price
changes in Proposition 2.
In what follows, we let (P1  P0)0 = ((P1 P0)1; :::; (P1 P0)N); where (P1 P0)j
is the jth component of (P1 P0): Scalar components for other vectors are indicated
in a similar manner.
Lemma. The N x 1 vectors x0 = (x1;x0 1) and z
0 = (z1; z0 1) and the matrix
M = [I    x0
v 1z0

] satisfy M[I+V
 10 ] = I where
15See, for example, Lee and Park (2009) and Gantchev et al. (2013) who nd evidence of the
impact of activism in the target rm a¤ecting other rms.
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x1 =
1
c
[v0!1   !11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1 + v0 1!1 1)]
x 1 =
1
c
[
 1 1;0v   
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v)
(1 + v0 1!
1
 1)
!1 1]
z1 =
!11
c(1 + v0 1!
1
 1)
z 1 =
1
c(1 + v0 1!
1
 1)
[(1 + v0!1)!1 1   !11
 1 1;0v]
c = 1 + v0!1   2!11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1 + v0 1!1 1) and
0 <   1:
SinceM[I+V
 10 ] = I; it follows that

 1
0 M is the inverse of [
0+V]: Because
this latter matrix is assumed to be positive denite, its inverse must have positive
diagonal elements. It follows that the upper left diagonal element of 
 10 M must be
positive and this can only happen if c(1 + v0 1!
1
 1) > 0: For the remainder of the
paper we assume that the parameters satisfy c > 0 and 1 + v0 1!
1
 1 > 0:
This lemma allows us to present the equilibrium prices at t = 1 explicitly. We do
this in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. At time t = 1, 11= 0+me1 and
11 = 
0+V; and i1= 0
and 
i1 = 
0; i = 2; :::;M: Then the equilibrium prices can be written as
(P1  P0) =

g1
 g2v 1

where
g1 =
d1
cd
[m  v01=d+ 1
d
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v)=(1 + v
0
 1!
1
 1)]
g2 =
d1
cd
[
!11
1 + v0 1!
1
 1
(m  v01=d) + 1
d
(1 + v0!1)] and
 =
d  d1
d
:
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Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate the result of the surreptitious acquisition of
shares by A. As predictions of the changes that his activism would produce caused
him to seek to alter his portfolio holdings consistent with his predictions. Because
he had to acquire shares in the market16, and because his view of future prices was
di¤erent from that of other investors, the market exchange was characterized by a
heterogeneous information equilibrium. Under these conditions, Propositions 2 and
3 establish the relationship between As predictions and their impact on prices and
holdings of all market participants at time t = 1. In particular, Proposition 3 shows
how changes in the variance or covariances a¤ect the price change of rm 1; and all
prices connected to rm 1: Furthermore, Proposition 2 extends this observation to
the holdings themselves.
Should A believe that the result of his activism would have no additional e¤ect
on the covariances between rm 1 and the remaining rms, i.e., v 1 = 0; then from
Proposition 3, it follows immediately that prices other than the price of shares of
the rst rm would not change. However, using Proposition 2 under the condition
that v 1 = 0; we note that holdings for all investors change nevertheless. That is,
a rebalancing of portfolios occurs for all investors even though only the price of the
shares of the target rm changes. Since these rebalancings involve a money exchange,
this demonstrates that a change in the price of the target rm, by itself, is not enough
to evaluate the impact of activism on shareholders of this rm. This observation leads
us to propose, in Section 4 below, a method of evaluation that avoids this criticism.
Examining the change in the price of the shares of rm 1 exhibited in Proposition
3, it is not clear, in general, that this price increases without imposing some further
conditions. These conditions on g1 will be claried when, after discussing the remain-
16See, for example, Kahan and Rock (2007, p. 1069) where they state "... it is noteworthy
that activist hedge funds usually accumulate stakes in portfolio companies in order to engage in
activism." Italics in original.
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ing two equilibria, we address the preliminary decision that A would have had to have
made to become an activist in the rst place.17
Assuming A has acquired su¢ cient shares at time t = 1; then at t = 2; he
announces this by ling Schedule 13D. With the release of information contained in
his ling of Schedule 13D, all investors, except for A, institute a trading round based
on this new information. A is not be involved in this trading round since we assume
his acquisition of additional shares was predicated on the fact that he would continue
to hold shares long enough to execute his plan.18 Thus, the trading round at time
t = 2 is again one of homogeneous information, but with the number of shares held
by A excluded from the competition.
More precisely, at time t = 2, A does not trade and each of the other investors
learns of the information held by A. Thus, at this time we have M   1 investors
sharing the same information i2 = 0+me1 and 
i2 = 
0+V; i = 2; :::;M: The
result of this competition is contained in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. At time t = 2, A does not trade, and i2 = 0 + me1 and

i2 = 
0 +V; i = 2; :::;M: Then the equilibrium solution yields P2 = 0 +me1 
1
d d1 (
0+V)(1  x

11) and x

i2 = x

i1 for i = 2; :::;M:
Proposition 4 establishes the fact that the new information acquired by the re-
maining investors when A abstains from the trading round has no impact on their
17We need to delay the discussion for the following reason. Under the assumptions that A will
have acquired additional shares, he will be able to begin his e¤orts to alter the direction of the
rm. This, however, has come at a cost of acquiring these additional shares that can be written as
P01(x

11 x01): In the initial decision as to whether to become an activist, A must consider this cost
against the expected revenue he will subsequently receive when he has nished his activist activities
and sells his extra shares on the market.
18See Cli¤ord (2008) who nds that hedge funds do not seem to buy or sell additional shares when
they change from a passive status to an active one, although that change in status necessitates a
ling of Schedule 13D.
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holdings. The intuition for this result is as follows. A would not wish to sell his re-
cently acquired shares in rm 1 since this would undermine his purpose as an activist.
Given this point, he would not wish to trade his shares in other rms either, since
he already optimized his holdings in these rms in conjunction with his purchase of
additional shares in rm 1 when using his private information. (In fact, he would
be at a disadvantage to trade in a market in which all investors had the same infor-
mation as he did.) On the other hand, the other investors, having been alerted to
the activism by the Schedule 13D ling, now may want more of the shares of rm 1,
and can only get those shares from among themselves. In their attempt to get more
shares, the prices will change. At these changed prices, however, it becomes optimal
for these other investors to end up with portfolios identical to the ones they selected
at time t = 1:19
Subsequently, at time t = 3, there is new information since it becomes known as
to whether or not A was successful. The distributional parameters held by all market
participants, including A, then are either 0+me1 and 
0+V if A were successful,
or 0 and 
0 otherwise. Thus, all investors participate in a homogenous information
equilibrium. Should this equilibrium result in the sale of su¢ cient shares in rm 1
by A, then at this time A les Schedule 13D/A, acknowledging the change in his
ownership. The next proposition provides the results.
19In form, the result of Proposition 4 bears a resemblance to equation (3) in Admati et al. (1994).
This resemblance is deceiving for two reasons. First, the shares acquired by the activist in Admati
et al. were acquired strategically, that is, not as a price-taker, whereas our activist acquired his
shares in a Walrasian market. Second, though rms are considered correlated in the Admati et al.
paper, it is assumed that activism can only a¤ect the mean of the distribution of prices whereas we
assume activism can a¤ect both the mean of the distribution and its covariance matrix. Neglecting
the impact on the covariance structure obscures the necessary portfolio rebalancing and the costs
associated with it.
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Proposition 5. At t = 3, if A is successful, i3 = 0+me1 and 
i3 = 
0+V;
i = 1; :::;M: At t = 3; if A is not successful, i3 = 0 and 
i3 = 
0; i = 1; :::;M:
If A is successful, the equilibrium price P3 = PU3 = 0+me1 1d(
0+V)1; if A is
unsuccessful, the equilibrium price is P3 = PL3 = P0: In either case, x

i3 = x

i0 =
di
d
1:
One interesting feature of Proposition 5 is that whether successful or not at time
t = 3; A chooses to sell the additional shares he acquired at time t = 1 in rm
1:20 That is, there is no way for A, if successful, to take advantage of the improved
distribution of prices once the result of his activism becomes known. In equilibrium,
the combined demand of all the shareholders, including A, force this result.
The derivations of the equilibria in our model were predicated on an initial decision
made by A: The decision to become an activist or not. In the next Section we discuss
how this preliminary decision was made.
3 The Decision to Become an Activist
In our model, A approaches the decision to become an activist with a presumption
of how the future value of the target rm, as well as the future values of other rms,
would change as a result of his activism. This is summarized by the parameters of his
subjective probability distribution of the future value of the target as well as other
rms in the market. Under what conditions does this distribution warrant activism?
In considering this distribution, A is aware that he will have a signicant impact
on the equilibria that follow. A also knows that to acquire shares or to sell shares,
he must involve himself in these competitive equilibria. Since A can anticipate the
results of these equilibria in expectation, he can also anticipate the costs of all of the
portfolio rebalancing involved as well as the portfolio he would hold when he exits
20See Brav et al. (2008), where it is noted that the shedding of excess shares when activism is
concluded is typically via sales in the market.
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the target rm. Using these results, for A to proceed, we assume that the parameters
of this distribution must satisfy two conditions. First, the parameters must a¤ord
A the expectation of acquiring su¢ cient additional shares in the target rm at time
t = 1 to enable his activism. Second, the parameters must a¤ord A the expectation
of avoiding a loss over the course of his activism. We assume that activism will occur
only when both of these conditions are satised. We next show that satisfying these
conditions is equivalent to placing constraints on the parameters of As subjective
probability distribution.
We denote by CA1 the condition that A expects to acquire more shares in the
target rm. Using the notation established above, we write CA1 as (x11 x10)1 > 0.21
From Propositions 2 and 3, we have
(x11   x10)1 = (d  d1)!10(P1  P0)
= (d  d1)[g1!11   g2v0 1!1 1]:
Thus, the constraint CA1 is equivalent to g1!11  g2v0 1!1 1 > 0 and is satised when
the parameters of As subjective probability distribution satisfy this inequality. The
expectation of acquiring additional shares does not imply that the expectation of the
change in price of the shares of the target rm at time t = 1; g1; is positive: That
is, CA1 can be satised with g1 < 0; depending on whether v0 1!
1
 1 is su¢ ciently
negative.
We denote by CA2 the condition that A expects not to su¤er a loss over the
course of his activism. From Proposition 5, it follows that the money exchanged
in As rebalancing resulting from the equilibrium at time t = 3 is P03(x

11   x13):
Since x13 = x

10; this amount can be written as P
0
3(x

11   x10): Similarly, the money
exchanged by A at time t = 1 due to rebalancing is P01(x

10   x11): Thus, the total
money exchanged by A from t = 1 to t = 3 is (P3 P1)0(x11 x10): Starting with the
21We could have imposed the requirement (x11   x10)1 >  > 0 but for convenience chose  = 0:
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portfolio value P00x

10 and ending with the portfolio value P
0
3x

10; As total change in
portfolio value is (P3 P0)0x10: Thus, the change in value to A from his involvement
in activism is given by (P3 P1)0(x11 x10) + (P3 P0)0x10: Since at time t = 3; P3
can take on one of two values (refer to Proposition 5), As expected change in value
from activism is E(P3 P1)0(x11 x10)+E(P3 P0)0x10 where E is the expectation
taken with respect to the binary distribution of P3. Finally, we can write CA2 as
the constraint E(P3 P1)0(x11  x10) +E(P3 P0)0x10 > 0: As with CA1, we can
write the inequality of CA2 in terms of the parameters of As subjective distribution
by using Propositions 2, 3 and 5.
Together, we call the two conditions for activism, CA1 and CA2, CA and note
that CA places constraints on the parameters that the potential activist brings to the
problem. Only when CA is satised will A proceed. The implied constraints formalize
the idea that among all possible targets that A might choose, only some are deemed
worthy of pursuing. For the remainder of the paper we assume that the constraints
in CA hold.
4 Methodology to Evaluate Activism
Having established the condition CA that permits an activist to proceed, and having
presented the results of the equilibria over the course of As involvement with the
target rm, we now use these results to construct a methodology to evaluate activism.
Our method of evaluating activism takes the sequence of derived equilibria as given
and provides an answer to the question: How did the activist, A, and the group of
investors excluding the activist, G, fare over the course of activism?
Our method of evaluation depends on the creation of a measure for A and for
G, each of which involves two calculated values. The rst calculated value is the
sum of the money exchanged for the rebalancing of the portfolios required at each of
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the intervening equilibria (t = 1; 2 and 3) for A and G, respectively: We designate
these rebalancing amounts for A and G as R(A) and R(G); respectively. The sec-
ond calculated value is the di¤erence between the portfolio value held at the end of
activism (t = 3) and the portfolio value held prior to activism (t = 0) for A and G,
respectively. We designate these di¤erences for A and G as D(A) and D(G); respec-
tively. We use these calculated values to dene the measure of evaluation for A as
	(A) = R(A) + D(A) and for the remaining investors, G, as 	(G) = R(G) + D(G):
Since the function 	 represents the net nancial gain (loss) over the course of ac-
tivism, we say that activism benets A if, at time t = 3; 	(A) > 0 and activism
benets G if, at time t = 3; 	(G) > 0: We next use the equilibria results to evaluate
the 	 functions explicitly.
We begin with A. As argued in Section 3 above, the sum of the money exchanged
byA in rebalancing over the period of activism, R(A); is given by (P3 P1)0(x11 x10):
(At time t = 2; A is not involved in the equilibrium so there is no rebalancing on
his part.) Also, from Section 3, the change in As portfolio value, D(A); is given by
(P3   P0)0x10: Thus, the evaluation of activism for A is 	(A) = (P3   P1)0(x11  
x10) + (P3  P0)0x10: Since this evaluation occurs at time t = 3; P3 = PU3 or PL3 (see
Proposition 5). Note, unlike the similar calculation done by A to satisfy CA2, this
evaluation takes place at time t = 3; when the value of P3 is known. Since, from
Proposition 1, x10 =
d1
d
1; D(A) = d1
d
(P3   P0)01: The quantity (P3   P0)01 is the
actual change in the market value due to activism over its course, and we denote it by
S: Thus, 	(A) = R(A) + d1
d
S; which depends on the change in market value caused
by activism, S; and demonstrates that this change is needed in evaluating activism
but in itself is not su¢ cient to measure the total impact of activism on A.
We now address 	(G); the measure of gain or loss from activism for the group
of other investors. We let xGt =
MP
j=2
xjt; t = 0; 1; 2; 3; be the group holdings at the
various equilibria. In line with the argument above, the money exchanged at time
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t = 1 for G is P10(xG0 xG1): At time t = 2; all money is exchanged among members
of G itself, and therefore there is no change for the group. Using the same argument
as used at time t = 1; and recalling that xG3 = x

G0; the money exchanged at time
t = 3 is P30(xG1   xG0): Thus the money exchanged due to portfolio rebalancing by
G is given by R(G) = (P3  P1)0(xG1   xG0): At time t = 3; G, having started with
a portfolio value P00xG0; is left with a portfolio value P
0
3x

G0 at time t = 3: Thus,
D(G) = (P3   P0)0xG0 and 	(G) = (P3   P1)0(xG1   xG0) + (P3   P0)0xG0: Since
xG0 = (1  d1d )1; 	(G) = R(G) + (1  d1d )S:
We note that although the equilibrium prices at time t = 1 play a role in our
evaluation method, by themselves they are only important in so far as they contribute
to R(A) and R(G): We next establish the relationship between 	(A) and 	(G):
Proposition 6.
(a) R(A) +R(G) = 0:
(b) 	(A) + 	(G) = S:
Proposition 6(a) establishes the fact that whatever nancial benet (loss) A ac-
quires in the rebalancing of portfolios, G loses (gains). However, achieving a benet
or a loss by itself provides no information as to whether activism is benecial, i.e.,
whether 	 > 0: Proposition 6(b) deals with this issue. Since S is the total change in
the market value due to activism, 6(b) shows that this change is split between A and
G. Since neither 	(A) nor 	(G) need be positive, this split may not imply a benet
for both. In fact, should S = 0; Proposition 6 shows that the result of activism is
zero-sum.
But is it reasonable to consider values of S  0? That is, if, as a consequence of
As considerations of becoming an activist, A determines that the value of the market
would fall as a result of his activism, would this imply that CA could not be satised?
We next show that there are circumstances in which this implied decline in the value
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of the market would not deter the potential activist from proceeding.
Proposition 7. There are instances of As subjective probability distributions
such that despite A being aware that the impact of his activism would lower the
value of the market, CA would be satised and A would proceed with activism.
Furthermore, if successful, A would benet but G would not.
The instance explored in the proof of Proposition 7 is where A expects that if he
succeeds in his endeavors, the sole result, aside from m > 0; would be to increase
the correlation, namely v2; between the target rm and one other rm, rm 2. The
assumption that v2 < dm < 2v2 where 0 < v2 < 1 ; is enough to show that CA is
satised. It also follows that the price of the target rm increases at time t = 1 and
at the same time the price of rm 2 decreases. This decrease causes a decrease in the
value of the market at this time. However, despite this, with CA satised, A proceeds
with his activism which, in turn, leads to a decrease in the value of the market over
the entire period of activism, i.e., S falls. Finally, we show that if A succeeds, A
benets and G does not benet. As a result of Proposition 7, in considering the
benets to those involved in activism, we must consider situations where activism
could cause changes in the value of the market that are negative as well as positive.
We next examine the relationship between 	(A) and 	(G); making this relation-
ship explicitly dependent on R(A) and S:
Proposition 8.
(a) 	(A) > 0 and 	(G) > 0 i¤ d1
d
S < R(A) < (1  d1
d
)S:
(b) 	(A) > 0 and 	(G) < 0 i¤R(A) > max[ d1
d
S; (1  d1
d
)S]:
(c) 	(A) < 0 and 	(G) > 0 i¤R(A) < min[ d1
d
S; (1  d1
d
)S]:
(d) 	(A) < 0 and 	(G) < 0 i¤ (1  d1
d
)S < R(A) <  d1
d
S:
The constraints in Proposition 8(a) can only be satised if S > 0: Thus, 8(a)
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exhibits the fact that for both parties to benet, S must be positive and A must be
constrained in the terms of the gains made in rebalancing his portfolio. Similarly, as
exhibited in part (d), when neither benet, it is necessary that S be negative and
A be severely restricted in the rebalancing amounts he can make. The intervening
results constrain R(A) but S may or may not be positive.
Our evaluation of activism is predicated on the knowledge of the outcome of the
As activities at time t = 3: The evaluations will change depending on whether or not
A is successful. The next proposition examines the relationship between 	(A) and
	(G) when this distinction is made.
Proposition 9.
(a) If A is successful, then
(1) 	(A) > 0:
(2) 	(G) > 0 i¤R(A) < (1  d1
d
)S:
(3) 	(G) < 0 i¤R(A) > (1  d1
d
)S:
(b) If A is not successful, then
(1) 	(A) < 0:
(2) 	(G) > 0:
Signicantly, Proposition 9(a) shows that A always gains when activism is suc-
cessful, while the gains or losses of G depend on the magnitude of the gains by A. As
the magnitude of the As gains increase, a point is reached where G loses. Part (b)
of the proposition shows that if A is not successful, A loses while G always gains.
One can interpret Proposition 9 more generally. Given thatA only proceeds having
already determined that CA is satised, A would be assured that, if successful, he
would benet by the amount 	(A): With this guarantee, A would proceed and, if
successful, at time t = 3 would receive 	(A): However, as a result of the activism,
the value of the market changes over that period by the amount S: Thus, A gets
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	(A) from the amount S, leaving the rest to G. Obviously, when 	(A) is too large
compared to S, G must make up the di¤erence, possibly resulting in a loss for G.
Our approach has the advantage that it separates A fromG in evaluating activism.
To be complete, we next consider what our method of evaluation would produce if
we used it to evaluate the totality of shareholders in the target rm, i.e., A and G
together. The evaluation of this enlarged group is referred to as 	(A+G): In keeping
with our method of evaluation, we dene 	(A+G) = R(A+G) +D(A+G) where
R(A+G) = R(A) +R(G) and D(A+G) = D(A) +D(G):
Proposition 10.
(a) 	(A+G) > 0 i¤ S > 0:
(b) If 	(A+G) > 0; then at least one of A and G will benet.
(c) If 	(A + G) > 0; then activism will benet only A or only G if R(A)
does not satisfy  d1
d
S < R(A) < (1  d1
d
)S:
Proposition 10 states that the enlarged group A+G benets over the course of
activism if and only if activism leads to an increase in market value. But from
Proposition 10(b) and 10(c), it follows that the benet to the enlarged group does
not necessarily translate to benets for both A and G. Thus, in claims for the benets
of activism, it is important to make clear the particular group that is being addressed.
This raises an issue with an evaluation of the impact of activism appearing in some
of the literature.22 There, the claim is made that activism benets shareholders since
the price of the target rm increases at the time of the Schedule 13D ling and
persists. This claim leaves unspecied or vague whether the group that benets in
the statement in the literature is A or G or A+G. If the shareholders referred to in
the empirical literature are either A or G, then Propositions 8 and 9 show that, with
diversied portfolio holders, this conclusion cannot hold. If, as in Proposition 10, we
22See, for examples, Brav et al. (2009) and Klein and Zur (2009).
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focus on the combined group, A+G, it is only under severely restrictive conditions
that an increase in the target price at the time of the Schedule 13D ling yields a
benet of activism over the course of activism, even when dealing with diversied
portfolio holders.
5 Discussion
Our method of evaluation of activism is applied separately to the activist and to the
group of other investors, as well as to the combined group of all shareholders, when the
activist and shareholders in the target rm are diversied portfolio holders of possibly
correlated rms. Our method is distinguished by several features. First, it depends on
two values computed from the series of price changes and portfolio changes resulting
from activism, namely from the funds exchanged due to portfolio rebalancing and
the change in market value over the course of activism, R(A) and S, respectively.
Second, the evaluation depends on all of the activities that occur from the moment
that the activist decides to become an activist by acquiring additional ownership in
the target rm until the moment the activist divests this additional ownership. Third,
a preliminary judgement to proceed with activism, the CA condition, is described and
assumed as a prerequisite to action.
We nd that when the activist is successful in his endeavors, he always benets.
The fact that the activist benets may be accompanied by a loss for the group of
other investors and/or a decline in the value of the market. If the activist is not
successful in his endeavors, he su¤ers a loss from his activities, the group of other
investors gains, and the value of the market does not increase. We show, however,
that the preliminary judgement to become an activist lessens the number of instances
that will lead to the activists failure to successfully complete his plans. Thus, we
conclude that activism benets the activist, possibly at the expense of the group of
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other shareholders. In considering the combined group of the activist and the other
shareholders, we nd that this combined group benets if and only if the value of the
market increases as a result of activism; furthermore, the benets may not be shared
by both the activist and the group of other investors.
Our method of evaluation enables us to draw distinctions which we think have
been obscured in parts of the literature. Aside from being able to evaluate the ac-
tivist separately from the group of other investors, our method exposes the costs and
benets of the two, as well as the competition between them for any benets. For
example, the funds exchanged by the activist in rebalancing his portfolio over time,
R(A), equals  R(G): So gains made by the activist are at the expense of the group
of other investors. This relationship is hidden when the focus is on the totality of all
the shareholders, the activist plus the group of other investors.
Our model relies heavily on the assumption that activism may alter the covariance
structure between the target rm and other rms. In support of this assumption, we
nd empirical evidence that activism a¤ects rms other than the target rm. In fact,
there are instances in which the covariance structure becomes meaningful in the strat-
egy of the activist.23 See, for example, the description of AXAs proposed acquisition
of MONY in Kahan and Rock (2007), and Lee and Park (2000) who demonstrate the
impact of activist behavior on the prices of other rms. Also, Greenwood and Schor
(2009) show that targets for which a merger or sale of part of the assets earn more
than targets without those prospects, Becht et al. (2014) conrms a similar nding
internationally, and Gantchev et al. (2013) document spillover reactions of hedge
23One particular recent event provides a useful example of an activity of an activist attempting
to alter the covariance between rms. In this case, the hedge fund Eminence Capital owns stakes in
both Mens Wearhouse and Jos. A. Bank, and has made clear that it desires the takeover bid of the
latter by Mens Wearhouse to be successful. See Michael J. de la Merced, "Jos. A. Bank in Talks
to Buy Eddie Bauer," New York Times, 2/3/14. (On 3/11/14, Mens Wearhouse agreed to buy Jos.
A Bank.)
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fund activism.24
When the activist is successful, why is it that the activist benets while the group
of other investors may not? The reason becomes clear when glancing at the sequence
of equilibria over the course of activism. It is apparent at the outset at time t = 1
that the activist brings private information to the equilibrium (his plan to alter the
future value of the target rm) giving him an advantage that carries through the rest
of his involvement with the target rm. This advantage is similar to that of inside
information, albeit future inside information. Furthermore, when this information
leads to protable rebalancing exchanges, R(A) > 0; the activist gains at the expense
of the group of other investors.
Turning to our assumptions, we have assumed that there is a single activist in a
single rm. This assumption can be generalized to many activist in many rms using
the same approach we employed here. The further assumption that these multiple
activists could form coalitions adds an additional complexity not resolvable by our
approach and needs further consideration.
We have assumed the activists activities would lead, in expectation, to an increase
24Other strategies that may exploit the covariance structure include those that make use of hidden
ownership (that is, economic ownership held without voting rights) and empty voting (that is, voting
exceeding economic ownership); see Hu and Black (2007). However, the use of derivatives, and in
particular, equity swaps, to mask the accumulation of shares that would necessitiate a 13D ling,
has been challenged in Federal Court in connection with a case involving The Childrens Investment
Fund and CSX; see, for example, Stowell (2010). According to Stowell (2010, p. 249), the 2008 ruling
in the CSX vs. The Childrens Investment Fund Management case "represents a strong challenge to
hedge funds who attempt to conceal their true economic position through the use of derivatives."
We note that more recently, the 2nd Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, considering the same case,
left unsettled exactly under what circumstances cash-settled total equity swap agreements provide
benecial ownership. In the context of the Dodd-Frank Act, since section 766(b) amends Sections
13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act, this issue remains not fully settled. See Cuillerier and Hall
(2011).
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in the price of the target rm, m > 0: However, the case when m < 0 falls within the
purview of our model since the conditions that allow activism to proceed, CA, can be
satised in that case. In that situation, the activists activities, in expectation, hurt
the target rm while the activist gains through the induced changes in the covariance
structure.
Finally, we assumed that no new public information becomes available between
times t = 2 and t = 3:We could modify our model by assuming a leakage of informa-
tion in that interval as to the eventual success of the activists endeavors.
We conclude that there is a disproportionate advantage to the activist from his
activism. The source of this advantage stems from the private information that
the activist uses at time t = 1 to surreptitiously acquire additional ownership in
the target rm. Policy recommendations to correct this imbalance might include
ways in which the intent of activism might be exposed to the public as soon as
possible. Some discussions relating to the Dodd-Frank Act along these lines are
currently under consideration. Since secrecy is at the heart of the imbalance just
described, we o¤er the following proposals that might o¤er more openness. First,
the ten day delay before requiring the ling of Schedule 13D should be shortened.
Second, no exemption from the regulation to le 13D should be permitted. Third,
using derivatives etc., to obscure benecial ownership should be precluded. Fourth,
restrictions on coalitions of activists should be imposed to thwart gaming. Last, newly
proposed coalitions of investors, board members, and advisers, which appear to be
designed to be countervailing thrusts against activists,25 need to be studied to see if
their access to company information creates another opportunity for a form of inside
information.
25See, David Gelles, "Unlikely Allies Seek to Check Power of Activist Hedge Funds," New York
Times, 2/3/14.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. In Rabinovitch and Owen (1978; hereafter RO) they
proved that, under the assumptions we have made concerning utilities and distrib-
utions, the equilibrium solution for the general heterogeneous portfolio problem can
be written as xi1 = di

 1
i1 [i1 P1] where di = 1=ai and where P1 is chosen to sat-
isfy
MP
i=1
xi1 = 1: Evaluating the RO solution under the present assumptions yields

11x

11 = d1(11 P1) and for i > 1; 
0xi1 = di(0 P1): It follows that
x11 x10= x11 d1d 1 = d1
 111 (11  
111=d P1)
= d1

 1
11 (0 +   (
0 + 
)1=d P1)
= d1

 1
11 (P0  P1 +  
1=d):
Also, xi1 xi0 = xi1 did 1 = di
 10 (0  
01=d P1)
= di

 1
0 (P0 P1):
Summing over i = 1; :::;M; we have
0 = (d  d1)
 10 (P0 P1) + d1
 111 (P0  P1 +  
1=d) or
[(d  d1)
 10 + d1
 111 ](P1 P0) = d1
 111 ( 
1=d):
Multiplying through by 
11 and substituting, we have
[(dI + (d  d1)

 10 ](P1 P0) = d1( 
1=d):
This establishes the price equation.
From above, x11   x10 = d1
 111 (P0 P1) + d1
 111 ( 
1=d):
Also from above, this can be written as
=  d1
 111 (P1 P0) + [(d  d1)
 10 + d1
 111 ](P1 P0)
= (d  d1)
 10 (P1 P0):
Finally, since we established above that for i > 1; xi1   xi0 =  di
 10 (P1 P0);
the proposition is proved.
Proof of Lemma. We must show that
h
I    (x1;x0 1)
v 1(z1;z0 1)
i h
I + 
  v0
 10
v 1!10
i
= I:
We begin by solving for x: It must satisfy
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 

(x1;x
0
 1)
v 1(z1; z0 1)

+

v0
 10
v 1!1
0

  

x1v
0
 10 + (x
0
 1v 1)!
10
v 1(z1v0
 10 + (z
0
 1v 1)!1
0)

= 0:
It follows that
x1 = v
0!1   x1v0!1   (x0 1v 1)!11
x 1 = 
 1 1;0v   x1
 1 1;0v   (x0 1v 1)!1 1:
Similarly,
z1 = !
1
1   z1v0!1   (z0 1v 1)!11
z 1 = !1 1   z1
 1 1;0v   (z0 1v 1)!1 1:
Pre-multiplying x 1 by the vector v0 1; we have
(v0 1x 1) = (1  x1)(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1 + v0 1!1 1) which implies
x 1 = (1  x1)
h

 1 1;0v  v
0
 1

 1
 1;0v
1+v0 1!
1
 1
!1 1
i
; and
x1 = v
0!1   x1v0!1 (1  x1) v
0
 1

 1
 1;0v
1+v0 1!
1
 1
!1 1:
Solving for x1 yields
x1 =
v0!1 !11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1+v0 1!1 1)
1+[v0!1 !11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1+v0 1!1 1)]
:
We let c = 1 + [v0!1   !11(v0 1
 1 1;0v)=(1 + v0 1!1 1)]:
The development of z proceeds in the same fashion yielding
z1 =
!11
c(1+v0 1!
1
 1)
and
z 1 = ( 1c(1+v0 1!1 1))[(1 + v
0!1)!1 1   !11
 1 1;0v]:
Proof of Proposition 3. FromProposition 2, we have [I+d d1
d


 10 ](P1 P0) =
d1
d
( 
1=d): From the Lemma, there exists an M such that
P1 P0 = d1
d
M( 
1=d) for  = d  d1
d
:
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Substituting the values for  and 
; we have
P1 P0 = d1
d
M[me1   1
d

v01
v 1

=
d1
d
M

m  v01=d
 1
d
v 1

=
d1
d
f

m  v01=d
 1
d
v 1

  

(x1;x
0
 1)
v 1(z1; z0 1)

m  v01=d
 1
d
v 1

g
=
d1
d
[

(1  x1)(m  v01=d) +  1dx0 1v 1
 v 1[z1(m  v01=d)] + 1d(1  z0 1v 1)

]:
Substituting from the proof of the Lemma, we have
P1 P0 = d1
cd

m  v01=d+  1
d
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v)=(1 + v
0
 1!
1
 1)
 v 1[ !
1
1
1+v0 1!
1
 1
(m  v01=d) + 1
d
(c+
2!11
1+v0 1!
1
 1
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v))]

=
d1
cd

m  v01=d+  1
d
(v0 1

 1
 1;0v)=(1 + v
0
 1!
1
 1)
 v 1[ !
1
1
1+v0 1!
1
 1
(m  v01=d) + 1
d
(1 + v0!1)]

=

g1
 v 1g2

:
Proof of Proposition 4. Given the homogeneous information set, the equilib-
rium solution would be xi2 =
di
d d1 (1  x11) andP2 = 0+me1  1d d1 (
0+V)(1  x

11):
But from the proof of Proposition 2, for i > 1; 
0xi1 = di(0   P1) which implies
that (1  x11)=(d   d1) = 
 10 (0 P1): Thus, xi2 = did d1 (d   d1)
 10 (0 P1) =
di

 1
0 (0 P1) = xi1:
Proof of Proposition 5. At time t = 3; all participants share the same infor-
mation. Thus, we have two cases of a homogeneous equilibrium, di¤ering only in
the specication of the parameters of the distribution of prices. This specication, in
turn, depends on the success or failure of the activist.
30
Proof of Proposition 6.
Part (a):
R(A) +R(G) = (P3  P1)0(x11   x10) + (P3  P1)0(xG1   xG0)
= (P3  P1)0[(x11 + xG1)  (x10 + xG0)]:
Since (x11 + x

G1) = (x

10 + x

G0) = 1; the result follows.
Part (b): Since 	(A) = R(A) + d1
d
S and 	(G) = R(G) + (1  d1
d
)S; the proof
follows from part (a).
Proof of Proposition 7. We demonstrate this proposition as follows. We rst
propose a subjective probability distribution that summarizes As belief in the con-
sequences of his activism, should he proceed. We next show that this distribution
satises the CA conditions and thus A proceeds with his activism. A consequence
of this decision is that the value of the market, S; falls over the period of activism.
Last, we show that should A be successful, he will benet from his activism but G
will not.
For the probability distribution, we propose the following parametric values. Let

0 =
0@ I2x2 0
0 D
1A where I2x2 is the 2 x 2 identity matrix and D is a positive denite
matrix. Let v be the vector with v2 in its second position and zeros elsewhere, with
0 < v2 <
1

: Let v2 < dm < 2v2:
It follows from this specication that
0+V is positive denite for any 0 <  < 1:
Also, since 
 10 =
0@ I2x2 0
0 D 1
1A ; we have !1 = e1 and !2 = e2 where e2 has a 1 in
its second position and zeros elsewhere. Using these values to evaluate the parameters
of Proposition 3, we have c > 0; g1 = d1cd [m  1dv2+ d v22] and g2 = d1cd [(m  1dv2)+ 1d ]
and thus g1 > 0 and g2 > 0: We next address the CA conditions.
The condition CA1 requires that the sign of g1!11   g2v0 1!1 1 be positive. But
g1!
1
1   g2v0 1!1 1 = g1 > 0 thus satisfying CA1. The condition CA2 requires that
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E(P3 P1)0(x11 x10)+E(P3 P0)0x10 be positive. This expression can be written
as (PU3  P1)0(x11 x10) (P1 P0)0(x11 x10)+ d1d (PU3  P0)01: The vectorPU3  P0 =
me1  1dV1 which by Proposition 2 equals 1d1 [dI+(d d1)V
 10 ](P1 P0): It follows
that (PU3  P0)0(x11   x10) = d d1d1 (P1  P0)0
 10 [dI + (d  d1)V
 10 ](P1  P0) =
d(d d1)
d1
(P1 P0)0
 10 (P1 P0) + (d d1)
2
d1
(P1 P0)0
 10 V
 10 (P1 P0): Subtracting
(P1   P0)0(x11   x10) from this result and substituting the presumed values of the
parameters yieldsE(P3 P1)0(x11 x10) = (d d1)
2
d1
[g21+g
2
2v
2
2 2g1g2v2] = (d d1)
2
d1
[(g1 
g2v2)
2 + 2(1   )g1g2v2]: Finally, CA2 will be satised if (d d1)2d1 2(1   )g1g2v2 >
 d1
d
(PU3   P0)01 =  d1d (m   2dv2) = d1d (2v2d  m): As m increases to 2v2d the RHS
of this inequality goes to zero while the LHS remains positive. Thus, there will be an
m < 2v2
d
that satises CA2 and for this value of m, S = (PU3  P0)01 = m  2v2d < 0:
Finally, assume that at time t = 3; A is successful in his endeavors. Since CA2 is
satised, E(P3 P1)0(x11 x10) >  E(P3 P0)0x10: But E(P3 P1)0(x11 x10) =
(PU3  P1)0(x11 x10) (1 )(P1 P0)0(x11 x10): Substituting (d d1)
 10 (P1 P0)
for (x11   x10) using Proposition 2, we have that E(P3  P1)0(x11   x10) < (PU3  
P1)
0(x11   x10) and therefore (P3   P1)0(x11   x10) >  d1d (PU3   P0)01: Dividing
through by  yields R(A) >  d1
d
S > 0 or that 	(A) > 0 if A succeeds. Furthermore,
by Proposition 6, R(G) =  R(A): Since 	(G) =  R(A)+ d d1
d
S and S < 0 it follows
that 	(G) < 0: So A benets and G does not.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Part (a): 	(A) > 0 and 	(G) > 0 i¤R(A) >  d1
d
S and R(G) >  (1  d1
d
)S;
respectively. But since R(G) =  R(A); 	(G) > 0 i¤ R(A) < (1   d1
d
)S: Thus,
	(A) > 0 and 	(G) > 0 i¤ d1
d
S < R(A) < (1  d1
d
)S:
Parts (b), (c) and (d): The results of these sections follow by applying the
same argument used in part (a) to these three cases.
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Proof of Proposition 9.
Part (a1): We assumed that for activism to begin, CA was satised. In
particular, we assumed CA2 that E(P3   P1)0(x11   x10) + E(P3   P0)0x10 > 0:
But this inequality is just E	(A) > 0; i.e, the expectation taken before it becomes
known whether or not the activist will be successful. For this expectation to be
positive, it follows that 	(A) > 0 when A is successful. Also, when 	(A) > 0; then
R(A) >  d1
d
S: Using Proposition 7, parts (a2) and (a3) follow.
Parts (b1 and b2): If A is unsuccessful, then P3 = P0: Thus, S = 0 and
	(A) =  	(G): Also, when S = 0; 	(A) = (P3   P1)0(x11   x10) =  (P1  
P0)
0(x11   x10) =  (d  d1)(P1  P0)0
 10 (P1  P0) < 0 since 
0 is positive denite
and the results follow.
Proof of Proposition 10.
Part (a): By assumption, 	(A + G) = R(A) + R(D) + R(G) + D(G) =
	(A) + 	(G): But 	(A) + 	(G) = S by Proposition 6, so part (a) follows.
Part (b): If 	(A+G) > 0; then S > 0 by part (a). When S > 0; part (d) of
Proposition 7 cannot hold and thus part (b) follows.
Part (c): From part (b), the rst three parts of Proposition 7 can hold.
However, the exclusion of the case  d1
d
S < R(A) < (1   d1
d
)S disallows part (a) of
Proposition 7 and the result follows.
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